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This dissertation includes two essays on the economic aspects of information
security.
The first essay presents a principal-agent model for assessing the value of in-
formation security audits. The issue of information security investments is con-
founded by control problems arising from asymmetric information and conflicting
managerial interests within the firm. By analyzing the impacts of asymmetric
information and security audits, this study extends the literature in three ways.
First, the degree of information asymmetry is formally measured, which allows
one to study how different levels of information asymmetry affect information
security investment decisions. Second, the intensity of an information security
audit is explicitly modeled, and the interactions between information asymme-
try and security audits are examined. This analysis provides conditions under
which the benefit from security audits increases with the degree of information
asymmetry. Third, the current research provides an analytic model that helps
to explain existing empirical findings (e.g., Gordon and Smith, 1992) concerning
the relation between information asymmetry and the value of audits.
The second essay examines the economic costs of publicly announced infor-
mation security breaches. Similar to Campbell et al. (2003), the current study
applies the event study approach, but uses a larger sample and a more sophis-
ticated market model (Fama and French, 1993). The results confirm those of
Campbell et al. (2003) that security breaches involving confidential information
cause significant market reactions and security breaches not involving confiden-
tial information only cause insignificant market reactions. Further investigations
also suggest that the insignificance of market reactions to non-confidential events
does not seem to vary with the nature of those events.
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With wide adoption of computers and network technologies in organizations’
information infrastructures, the threat from financial losses due to cyber intru-
sions and/or information security breaches also increases. According to the 2003
CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, 75% of respondents had experi-
enced financial losses related to security breaches. A total of $202 million worth
of losses were reported by those organizations willing to provide an estimate of
such losses (Richardson 2003). The actual social financial loss is considered to
be even higher. A recent study by Campbell, Gordon, Loeb and Zhou (2003)
captures indirect as well as direct costs of information security breaches by in-
vestigating the stock market reaction to the disclosure of such breaches. The
evidence indicates a significant negative stock market reaction, when the infor-
mation breached is of a confidential nature. Hence, protecting information assets
from security breaches has become crucial for organizations.
This dissertation investigates two closely related, yet separate topics on eco-
nomics of information security. The first part provides a theoretical model on
the value of information security audits, especially, the effects of asymmetric
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information during the security investment process are explicitly analyzed. The
second part empirically examines the economic impacts of public announcements
of information security breach incidents.
1.1 Background on Asymmetric Information and
Security Investments
Along with the emphasis of information technologies, the expenditures by or-
ganizations in information security have increased significantly. Consequently,
organizations have begun to realize the importance of rational information se-
curity investments. The objective of information security investments is not to
obtain perfect security, but to protect the information system only to the extent
that organizations receive the greatest net benefits from such protections. Some
recent research has been done in this regard (e.g., Gordon and Loeb 2001, 2002).
These studies, when considering the optimal amount to invest in information se-
curity, ignore the agency problem within organizations. They implicitly assume
there’s no information asymmetry between different levels of management, i.e.,
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Information Security Officer
(CISO) share the same knowledge not only about the security of information
systems but the productivity of these investments as well. However, information
asymmetry is a widespread phenomenon in reality. When interest conflict exists
between different levels of management, information asymmetry may distort the
top management’s decisions. As a result, organizations are conducting various
information security audits, believing they could help to reduce the negative ef-
fects caused by information asymmetry. Nonetheless, little, if any, research has
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been dedicated to address the impacts of asymmetric information and security
audits on security investment decisions.
The primary objective of the first part of this dissertation is to show that
an information security audit provides value to an organization by reducing in-
formation asymmetry between the CEO and the CISO. More specifically, an
analytical model, based on a principal-agent framework, is used to capture the
characteristics of the problem. The model shows that when there exists informa-
tion asymmetry, CISOs may receive information rents, and CEOs’ investment
decision rules tend to deviate from those when there is no information asymme-
try. This deviation leads to an increase in CEOs’ total expected costs. Security
audits act to improve CEOs’ understanding of the system, hence reduce the
effects of the information asymmetry between CEOs and CISOs. As a result,
CEOs’ investment decision rules become closer to the optimal (full information)
rules. Another interesting result from the model is that the value of an infor-
mation security audit also depends on the information environment. As the
information asymmetry between CEOs and CISOs increases, the value of an
information security audit also increases.
1.1.1 Security Audits and Postaudits of Security Invest-
ments
Many consulting firms, specializing in either technology or accounting, provide
various security services. These services are conducted under different names,
like “security tests”, “system integration” and “vulnerability check”. One key
feature of these services is an information security audit. The purpose of a secu-
rity audit is to evaluate the internal controls in information systems. It helps to
3
detect systems’ errors, regardless of the causes, either technological or human.
The actual scope of security audits may include analyzing network infrastruc-
tures, reviewing implementation of systems’ controls, verifying administrative
controls, and identifying the vulnerability of the systems. The results from a se-
curity audit can be used to help management better understand pre-conditions
of information systems before security investments and hence allocate economic
resources more efficiently.
Another type of audit, postaudits, are also commonplace in practice. In a
postaudit, the actual benefits from an investment are examined and compared
with the estimates made before the investment. Research has shown that an
appropriate match between the sophistication of a postaudit and the level of
information asymmetry is associated with better firm performances on the stock
market (e.g., Gordon and Smith, 1992). For information security investments,
a postaudit can also be conducted to evaluate the actual cost savings from the
investments. Besides the different emphases of information security audits and
postaudits of information security investments, the two type of audits also differ
in the time when they are conducted. Information security audits can be con-
ducted both before and after information security investments, while postaudits
of information security investments can only be conducted after the results from
the security investments have been realized. The current study will focus on
security audits and leave postaudits of security investments for future research.
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1.2 Background on Impacts of Security Breaches
The purpose of information security is to protect organizations’ information as-
sets, to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of information sys-
tems. While the actual protection measures are mostly technological in nature,
the question of allocating limited economic resources in various security proce-
dures is more of an economic issue. In recent years, there have been a number
of theoretical studies applying economic analyses in the issues of information
security investments. For instance, Gordon and Loeb (2001, 2002) suggest that,
contrary to conventional wisdoms, it may not always be optimal to invest the
most money in information system with the highest vulnerability. Only after
thorough considerations of the potential financial loss, the vulnerability of the
system and costs of protecting the information, a cost-benefit efficient security
investment decision can be made.
In order to make appropriate security investment decisions, the financial
losses related to security breaches have to be better understood. There is much
anecdotal evidence regarding the economic impacts of security breaches. While
some view information breaches as a serious threat to the economy, others suggest
that they might be just a daily cost of doing business in the new information
age. In the existing literature, most of the research investigating the costs of
security breaches is survey-based. These studies show that majority of the orga-
nizations have experienced information security breaches during the last decade
and suffered significant financial losses. However, these surveys usually focus on
the direct costs of information security breaches (such as loss of business due to
denial-of-service attacks, or the costs of repairing the system after outbreaks of
computer viruses). The indirect costs of security breaches, such as reputation
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loss or decreased future sales are often ignored, making it difficult to present a
complete picture of the impacts of security breaches. There are a few exceptions
employing another approach, the event-study method (e.g., Campbell et al.,
2003, Garg, Curtis and Halper, 2003, Ettredge and Richardson, 2002 and Cavu-
soglu, Birendra and Raghunathan, 2002). These studies examine the market
reactions to information security breaches. The market reactions can reflect the
changes of investors’ expectations of future cash flows due to security breaches,
thus capture both direct and indirect costs of information security breaches.
The second part of this dissertation is an extension study following Campbell
et al. (2003). By expanding the scope of the event search, the current research
presents a larger sample. To better capture the market expectations, this study
also adopts the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model about returns on
common stocks. New hypotheses are developed and tested, the results provide
both enhanced empirical support to the conclusions of Campbell et al. (2003)
and new insights on the economic impacts of information breaches.
1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 Information Asymmetry and Principal-Agent Model
Information asymmetry and interest conflicts between the different parties within
organizations have long been recognized by both the business world and academic
researchers. As Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (1982) state, “... in most firms, various
tasks are performed or managed by different individuals each of whom has special
information or expertise concerning his particular sphere of activity. Usually
this information is not available to other individuals within the firm including
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the top management.” They further point out that “individuals with private
information also have interests which may diverge from those of the firm and
therefore may find it disadvantageous to reveal their privileged information freely
to top management.” The impact of these two factors on top management’s
decisions has been one of the central topics in management accounting research.
When the action of division managers (the agent) cannot be observed by the
headquarters (the principal), moral hazard problems arise. Holmstrom (1979) is
among the first to characterize this phenomenon using a theoretical model, an-
alyzing the interaction between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent.
Holmstrom (1979) shows that when the agent’s action is unobservable, the prin-
cipal may have to deviate from the optimal risk sharing rules when designing the
contract. The risk-averse agent is exposed to a certain amount of risk so that he
would be motivated to work towards the benefits of the firm.
Besides the agent’s hidden action, another form of information asymmetry
between the principal and the agent, hidden information, is also a widespread
phenomenon.1 When working on his delegated duties, the agent may acquire
private information on the productivity of the technology adopted or the un-
derlying state of the situation. Since this information is not available to the
principal, the agent may use it to pursue his personal utility maximization in-
stead of maximizing the firm’s profit. Including both hidden action and hidden
information, Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (1982) study the impacts of asymmetric
information and interest conflict on intrafirm resource allocation decisions.
Using a similar setup with Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (1982) but focusing on
1Based on the nature of principle-agent problems, Arrow (1985) first divides information
asymmetry into two categories: hidden action and hidden information.
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only hidden information, Antle and Eppen (1985) study the rationing of capital
investments. Their analyses suggest that if the agent possesses private informa-
tion about the return of investments, the principal will allocate the agent excess
resources (organizational slack). In some situations the optimal allocation policy
involves a hurdle rate greater than the cost of capital. The excess resources are
actually the information rent the principal pays to motivate the agent to report
truthfully. Neither the information rent nor the investment decisions are ex post
efficient; the optimal policy is just a trade-off between the two inefficiencies. The
studies in the literature agree that, when the principal and agent have different
goals, the existence of information asymmetry brings negative effects on the
firm’s performance and causes distortion of headquarter’s investment decisions,
as pointed out in Baiman (1990) “..., as a result of agency problems, often the
best that the principal can do is to distort production, risk-sharing and wealth
allocation from first best.”
To reduce such negative effects caused by information asymmetry, organiza-
tions engage in various monitoring/auditing activities. The effects of different
monitoring/auditing strategies raises interesting research questions in account-
ing. Ng and Stoeckenius (1979) show that, in the case of hidden action, when
the principal has to depend on the agent to report the outcomes of the agent’s
action, it becomes nearly impossible for the principal to motivate the agent. An
effort-averse agent can always choose a reporting strategy that conveys no infor-
mation on his effort, thus never have to work. An audit of the agent’s report has
value to the principal because it can induce truthful reporting while providing
incentives to the agent to work. Baron and Besanko (1984) also examine the
demand of audits under a regulator versus firm framework. In their model, the
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firm has private information about its cost, which in turn affects the regulator’s
price decision. The regulator may verify the firm’s report on cost through an
audit. They derive the optimal auditing strategy and prove that it improves the
social welfare.
While in much research (e.g., Baron and Besanko, 1984), the principal is
assumed either to always conduct an audit, or to conduct an audit with a prob-
ability, Dye (1986) deals with the optimality of lower-tailed audits. Lower-tailed
audits differ from the two types of audits mentioned above. As the name im-
plies, lower-tailed audits refer to deterministic audit policies that an audit always
happens when the outcome is lower than a threshold and never happens when
the outcome is higher than such threshold. Dye (1986) points out that in some
situations, when the principal can choose to audit on the agent’s hidden action,
a low-tailed audit is optimal.
Kim and Suh (1992) further extend the literature by allowing the principal
to determine the level of audit investments. They assume that the principal
can choose to invest in the monitoring technology which reveals information on
the agent’s hidden action. The optimal precision of the monitoring information
is endogenously determined in their model. They find that under a concave
monitoring technology, there exists interior optimal auditing strategy, that is, it
is not always optimal for the principal to conduct the audit, the audit will happen
randomly with a probability less than one. The principal tends to invest more
in monitoring when the outcome is worse. However, under a linear monitoring
technology, the principal will choose a deterministic auditing strategy, which is
very similar to the lower-tailed auditing derived by Baiman and Demski (1980)
and Dye (1986).
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Harris and Raviv (1996) is more focused on the effects of auditing during
the capital budgeting process. Similar to Antle and Eppen (1985), they also
assume the agent has better information on the productivity of investment than
the principal. Unlike Antle and Eppen (1985), Harris and Raviv (1996) incorpo-
rate a random audit in their capital budgeting process, assuming that the audit
can perfectly reveal the agent’s private information to the principle. Their re-
sults show that without an audit, the principle has to deviate from the optimal
(NPV maximizing) investment decisions in order to take advantage of the agent’s
private information. More specifically, the principal tends to overinvest in the
project with lower productivity and underinvest in the project with higher pro-
ductivity. A pre-committed audit policy can effectively reduce the costs resulted
from motivating the agent.
A majority of the studies on the value of auditing/monitoring are based on
the assumption that the principal can pre-commit to some auditing policy. Since
most of the time the agent is induced to comply with the contract, it might be
ex post inefficient for the principal to conduct an audit. Khalil (1997) addresses
the issues on auditing without commitment. He compares the case where the
principal can pre-commit to an audit with the case where the principal cannot
pre-commit, but can make an audit decision after the outcomes are realized.
He finds that when the principal can pre-commit, he will design the contract
so that the agent is unlikely to deviate from the contract. On the contrary,
when the principal cannot pre-commit, he will design the contract such that he
tends to audit more frequently. This suggests that when the threats of auditing
are credible, the principal relies more on the contract to motivate the agent,
while when the threats are not credible, the principal relies more on the audit
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to motivate the agent.
Beside the analytical studies mentioned above, a lot of empirical research
has also been done in the field of the information asymmetry and audits (e.g.,
Guillver, 1987, Myers, Gordon and Hamer, 1991, Gordon and Smith, 1992).
These empirical studies support the argument that audits/postaudits can add
value to the firms, e.g., the proper use of auditing procedures is positively related
to the firm’s long-term performance.
Both the analytical and empirical studies agree that the information asym-
metry has negative effects on organizations’ decision processes, and by adopt-
ing certain auditing procedures these negative effects can be reduced. When
discussing the effects of auditing under information asymmetry, most studies
typically assume that once an audit is conducted it reveals all the information
the agent withholds from the principal, even though the audit may only happen
with a certain probability. The information asymmetry between the principal
and the agent is generally deemed as a fixed background, in other words, the
degree of information asymmetry is rarely mentioned. One exception is Gordon
and Smith (1992). In their empirical tests they identify explicit proxies for both
information asymmetry and the sophistication of postauditing procedures. They
show that level of information asymmetry is an imperative factor in the appli-
cation of postauditing. Only a proper match between the level of information
asymmetry and the level of postauditing is associated with better performance
of firms on the stock market.
The model provided by the current study extends the literature in three
ways. First, the degree of information asymmetry is explicitly modeled. Like
in previous analytical work, the agent is assumed to possess private information
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about the investment environment. Moreover, at the meantime, the principal
can also observe an imperfect signal of the information the agent possesses.
The difference between the signal the principal observes and the more precise
information the agent possesses is explicitly described and used to measure the
degree of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. This
measure enables the examination of how the principal’s investment decisions
vary with the degree of the information asymmetry.
Second, security audits are assumed to be common procedures in security
investment processes, but they can only partially reveal the agent’s private in-
formation to the principal. Thus the effects of audits on the principal’s decisions
and the interaction between the magnitude of information asymmetry and the
accuracy of the audits can be formally examined.
And finally, the current model also provides a theoretical explanation to the
empirical results reported by Gordon and Smith (1992).
1.3.2 Impacts of Security Breaches
While today’s business world enjoys the benefits of information technologies, the
occurrences of information security breaches have become ubiquitous and pose a
serious question to both practitioners and researchers. Some argue that security
intrusions have caused severe financial loss to the breached firms, others view
the security breaches only as a normal cost of business. While there have been
numerous anecdotal reports from the media supporting both arguments, whether
information security breaches have significant economic impacts on the affected
firms remains an empirical question.
Many survey studies conducted in recent years (e.g., Yankee Group, 2000,
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Computer Economics Institute, 2002, Riverhad Networks, 2002, KPMG, 2002
and CSI/FBI survey, 2002, 2003) have documented the prevalence and mag-
nitude of information security breaches. Among these, Yankee Group (2000)
suggested that the denial-of-service attacks in February 2000 alone have caused
financial losses that totaled $1.2 billion. Based on the responses from 538 U.S.
firms, CSI/FBI survey (2002) found that in 2002, about 90% of the respondents
had experienced security breaches and on average, each security breach accident
costed $1.95 million. However, survey studies derive the results mostly from the
estimations provided by the responding organizations, which tend to include only
the direct costs. Moreover, the survey questionnaires are often of a descriptive
nature, which also limits the possibility of statistically evaluating the economic
impacts of information security breaches.
In contrast, the event-study approach examines the stock market reactions
to events under questions. The change of the stock price due to an informa-
tion security breach announcement incorporates the market’s perception of not
only the short-term costs incurred at the time of the breach, but also long-term
costs after the breach. A number of event studies regarding information security
breaches have been conducted. Among these studies, Ettredge and Richard-
son (2002) investigated the impacts of February 2000’s denial-of-service attack.
Firms involved in e-commerce were divided into two groups, B2C (business to
consumers) firms and B2B (business to business) firms. In their study, they
found that during the test window around the denial-of-service attack, in com-
parison with the market, the stock prices of both B2C and B2B firms dropped
significantly.
Using a market model, Cavusoglu et al. (2002) and Garg et al. (2003) both
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examined information security breaches’ impacts on the stock prices of breached
firms. Cavusoglu et al. (2002) showed that on average, small firms and firms
depending heavily on the Internet were associated with greater negative market
reactions to announced security breaches. They also detected a significant infor-
mation transfer effect, that is, the stock prices of Internet security firms increased
significantly around the time when security breaches were announced. Exclud-
ing all the computer virus events, Garg et al. (2003) presented similar results
regarding the price reactions of breached firms, and confirmed the information
transfer effect.
Campbell et al. (2003) employed the CAPM model and studied the eco-
nomic cost of publicly announced information security breaches. Besides the
standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression, they also applied the seem-
ingly unrelated regression (SUR) method to control the heteroskedasticity and
event clustering problems. Both methodologies showed that announcements of
information breach incidents only induced marginal negative market reactions.
However, further investigations revealed that the significance of market reactions
depended on the nature of the breaches. For information breaches involving con-
fidentiality (i.e., unauthorized access to proprietary information such as credit
card numbers), the affected firms’ stocks had statistically significant negative
price reactions, while for those breaches involving only non-confidential informa-
tion, the market reactions were not statistically significant.
The results of Campbell et al. (2003) provide insights on the decisions of
information security investments. Given that the breaches involving confidential
information tend to cause more severe economic consequences, organizations
should put more efforts safeguarding their confidential information assets, if all
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other things are equal. However, there are still some unsolved concerns on the
market’s reaction to information security breaches. Campbell et al. (2003) used
CAPM to measure the abnormal returns from the market. A lot of studies
(e.g., Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 1996) on capital market have suggested that
a single factor model like CAPM is not adequate to fully capture the multi-
dimension risks of the stock market. The second concern arises from the fact
that Campbell et al. (2003) did not differentiate between virus-based events and
non-virus-based events. As suggested by prior research (e.g. Garg et al., 2003),
computer viruses are trivial in nature, thus inclusion of virus-based information
security breaches may confound the results of event studies. So it would be
interesting to see if the results of Campbell et al. (2003) are sensitive to further
partition of the non-confidential events based on whether they were caused by
computer virus. The last concern is about the limited sample size in Campbell
et al. (2003). In econometrics, small sample sizes always lead to criticisms that
the results may not be representative. A larger and more comprehensive sample
would help to verify the validity of their conclusions.
The current study addresses the above concerns. First, this study extends
both the news sources and time period in the event search, thus increasing
the sample size; second, a more sophisticated model (Fama and French 1993
three-factor model) is adopted to assess the market reactions; and last, the non-
confidential security breach events are further partitioned based on whether they
are computer virus based, and the market reactions of each group are examined.
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1.4 Plan of Chapters
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an
analytic model on asymmetric information and information security audits. The
results and insights from the model are also discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is
dedicated to the empirical study on the impacts of information security breaches.
Chapter 4 provides some concluding remarks of this dissertation. The notations
and symbols used in the analytical model are listed in Chapter 5. The detailed
mathematical proofs for the model are provided in the Appendix.
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Chapter 2
Model on the Value of Information
Security Audits
2.1 Model Setup
CISOs generally have better and more timely information about the security of
their firms’ computer systems than do the firms’ CEOs. The CEOs have the
ultimate decision-making authority for allocating resources, improving the infor-
mation systems’ security, and yet rely on information provided by the CISOs.
The CEOs are more concerned about the efficiency of security investments, but
the CISOs focus on the level of system security. This leads to a typical principal
agent setup in economics literature (e.g., Holmstrom 1979), where the CEOs
behave as the principal and the CISOs as the agent.
Assume if a security breach were to happen, the organization would incur
loss L.1 Denote P (α, x) as the chance that a security breach of the information
system will happen. x is the amount of information security expenditures, and
1For simplicity, the model only considers the scenario where there is only one possible
breach, this setup follows directly from Gordon and Loeb (2001).
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α represents the state of information system. P (α, x) satisfies the following
conditions:









x→∞P (α, x) = 0,
where x ≥ 0.
As the amount spent in information security increases, the probability of a
security breach decreases, i.e., the expected cost saving from avoiding a security
breach increases. However, such cost saving increases at a decreasing rate as
the investment increases. As the security investment approaches infinity, the
probability of a security breach approaches zero.
The different values of α will impact the effects of information security ex-
penditures. For simplicity, assume α can only take two possible values, i.e.,
α = {αH ,αL}. More specifically, let
α =

αH w.p. PH ,
αL w.p. PL,
where PH is the probability that α = αH , PH + PL = 1 and αH > αL. Also
assume that
P (αH , x) > P (αL, x),
Px(αH , x) < Px(αL, x).
Note that the meaning of α is two-fold. First, α represents the vulnerability of
the information system. A higher α implies a higher chance of a security breach,
thus, αH reflects a high vulnerable system and a worse situation for the principal.
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Second, α also reflects the productivity of information security investments. The
marginal benefit of security investments is greater under αH , hence αH means
higher productivity of security investments.
Since the principal does not work directly on information systems, she has
less detailed knowledge than the agent. More specifically, the agent can directly
observe the true value of α, while the principal can only observe η, a signal of
α, where η = {αH ,αL}. Let the chance that principal knows the true value of α
by observing η be ξ (0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1), formally stated as:
P (η = αH |α = αH) = ξ,
P (η = αL|α = αL) = ξ.
Note that if η is negatively correlated with α, i.e., 0 ≤ ξ < 1
2
, the principal can
always interpret signal η reversely. Thus, without loss of generality, the model
only discusses the case where 1
2
≤ ξ ≤ 1.
The magnitude of ξ measures the information asymmetry between the prin-
cipal and the agent. When ξ = 1
2
, η does not provide any useful information
about α, the signal observed by the principal is independent of the value of the
true state, the information asymmetry between principal and agent is the most
severe. As ξ increases, signal η provides reflect information on α, that is, the
information asymmetry decreases. When ξ = 1, η contains perfect information
about α. In this case, the principal observes exactly the same signal as the agent
does, hence there is no information asymmetry between the principal and the
agent.
Figure 2.1 presents the timeline structure of the model. At time 0, the
principal observes signal η while the agent observes the true state of α. The
principal then forms a belief about the true state of α given her observation.
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Notations:
1. α = productivity of information security investment
2. α = agent’s message, a report of the productivity parameter α observed by 
the agent
3. η = signal of α observed by the principal
4. x = information security investment level
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agent a menu of  
contracts [x, S] and 
informs agent of the 
security audit policy, 
where x=x(α;η) and
S=S (α;η) depend on  
the agent’s message
Security audit 




chance q of 
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At time 1, since the principal cannot observe the true state on her own,
in order to minimize her total costs, she would utilize the agent’s information
by having the agent report the α he observed. The principal designs a menu
of contracts based on her belief to minimize her total expected expenditures.
The contracts include the security investment amount x and the agent’s salary
S ≥ 0, where the amounts of both depend on the agent’s report α̂. Meanwhile,
the principal also informs the agent of the security audit policy, which determines
the intensity of security audits.
At time 2, the agent selects the message α̂ that he reports to the principal.
Based on the contracts offered by the principal, the agent will choose the α̂ that
leads to a contract maximizing his own utility.
At time 3, the principal conducts the security audit as she committed. If the
principal were to conduct a complete system security check, the agent would be
caught when he’s lying. Let q be the chance that a security audit would discover
the truth if the agent lied. Once found lying, the agent will be removed imme-
diately and end up with zero utility. q represents the intensity of information
security audits.
At time 4, information security investment takes place. The agent invests x
in security.
At time 5, the results from security investment x are realized. The principal
may choose to postaudit these results and determine how much have been saved
by avoiding security breach.
The agent would also suffer from a security breach, since he may have to
endure certain reputation loss in the marketplace, or have certain intrinsic disu-
tility from having a breach, etc. Let βL be the agent’s disutility should a security
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breach happen. β measures the extent to which the agent suffers from security
breaches, where β ¿ 1. The expected disutility of the agent from a security
breach can be written as βP (α, x)L.2
During the process of information security investment, the principal is bur-
dened with the cost of information security investments, thus she always tries
to use such investments as efficiently as possible. However, the agent only cares
about the resulting security level and wishes to get as much investment as pos-
sible. This causes an interest conflict between the principal and the agent.
The model will focus on the events happening from time 0 to time 4, the
effects of postauditing will be left for future research.
2.2 Full Information Case
Before the discussions on the implications of information asymmetry, the full
information case will be introduced first as a benchmark.
In the full information case, there exists no information asymmetry, that
is, ξ = 1. The principal knows exactly what the agent knows. The principal
decides the optimal investment level and the agent’s salary to minimize her total
expected costs, which is the sum of the expected loss from security breaches, the
amount invested in information security and the agent’s salary. Assuming the
agent’s reservation utility is zero, the principal’s problem is:
min
x,S
P (α, x)L+ x+ S,
2This is somewhat analogous to a feature of the model of Harris and Raviv (1996), in which
a division manager’s utility increases with the allocation of capital to the division.
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subject to
S − βP (α, x)L ≥ 0.
When the true state is αH , the first order conditions are:
(1+ β)Px (αH , x
∗
H)L+ 1 = 0, (2.1)
S∗H − βP (αH , x∗H)L = 0; (2.2)
when the true state is αL, the first order conditions are:
(1+ β)Px (αL, x
∗
L)L+ 1 = 0, (2.3)
S∗L − βP (αL, x∗L)L = 0, (2.4)






L are solutions to the above equations. Given Px (αH , x) <




the principal simply invests more in information security when the system is
more vulnerable. The agent’s expected utility is the reservation utility (zero) in
both states.
2.3 Imperfect Information Case
2.3.1 Principal’s Inference
When there exists information asymmetry, i.e., 1
2
≤ ξ < 1, the principal only
observes an imperfect signal. However, she can formulate beliefs about the true
state based on the observed signal η.
The joint distribution of α and η is:
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α = αH α = αL
η = αH ξPH (1− ξ)PL
η = αL (1− ξ)PH ξPL
If the principal observes η = αH , she can infer, using Bayes’ rule, that
Pr (α = αH |η = αH) = Pr (α = αH , η = αH)
Pr (η = αH)
=
Pr (α = αH , η = αH)
Pr (α = αH , η = αH) + Pr (α = αL, η = αH)
=
ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL .
Similarly, the principal can formulate the following conditional probabilities
about the true states.
Pr (α = αL|η = αH) = (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL ,
Pr (α = αH |η = αL) = (1− ξ)PH
(1− ξ)PH + ξPL ,
Pr (α = αL|η = αL) = ξPL
(1− ξ)PH + ξPL .
The marginal distribution of η is
Pr (η = αH) = ξPH + (1− ξ)PL,
Pr (η = αL) = (1− ξ)PH + ξPL.
2.3.2 Minimizing Principal’s Expected Costs
Based on her belief, the principal will design the contract to minimize her ex-
pected costs. Denote the principal’s minimized expected costs as CH when
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η = αH is observed, and CL when η = αL is observed. The ex ante expected
costs of the principal before observing signal η are
C = Pr (η = αH)CH + Pr (η = αL)CL,
where Pr (η = αH) = ξPH + (1− ξ)PL is the probability that the principal ob-
serves η = αH , and Pr (η = αL) = (1− ξ)PH + ξPL is the probability that the
principal observes η = αL.
By the revelation principal,3 only the contracts inducing the agent to tell
the truth need to be considered, that is, the principal will design the contract
such that the agent is motivated to always tell the truth in his report. Figure
2.2 illustrates the agent’s payoff under various scenarios. When the principal
observes η = αH and the agent reports α̂ = αH , the agent will receive xHH
as the amount of security investment and SHH as the agent’s salary; when the
principal observes η = αH and the agent reports α̂ = αL, the agent will receive
xHL and SHL; when the principal observes η = αL and the agent reports α̂ = αH ,
the agent will receive xLH and SLH ; when the principal observes η = αL and the
agent reports α̂ = αL, the agent will receive xLL and SLL.
If the principal observes η = αH , she infers that the probability of αH being
the true state is Pr (α = αH |η = αH), and the probability of αL being the true





ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + SHH ]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + SHL]
)
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Figure 2.2: Agent’s Payoff
subject to
SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L ≥ 0, (2.5)
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L ≥ 0, (2.6)
SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L ≥ (1− q) [SHL − βP (αH , xHL)L] , (2.7)
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L ≥ (1− q) [SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L] . (2.8)
Constraints (2.5) and (2.6) make sure that the agent will get at least his
reservation utility regardless the true state he observes. Constraint (2.7) guar-
antees that the agent’s utility from telling the truth is greater than or equal to
his utility from lying when he observes worse state (α = αH). Constraint (2.8),
following the same logic, guarantees the agent’s utility from truth-telling is no
less than his utility from lying when he observes the better state (α = αL). The
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last two constraints ensure that the agent can get as least as much utility when
he tells the truth as he lies. In other words, the principle designs the contracts
in a way that the agent never has incentives to lie in his report. In the rest of
discussions, when the agent’s report is mentioned, α will be used instead of α̂
since α̂ will always truthfully reflect the true state α.






(1− ξ)PH + ξPL [P (αH , xLH)L+ xLH + SLH ]
+
ξPL
(1− ξ)PH + ξPL [P (αL, xLL)L+ xLL + SLL]
)
subject to
SLH − βP (αH , xLH)L ≥ 0, (2.9)
SLL − βP (αL, xLL)L ≥ 0, (2.10)
SLH − βP (αH , xLH)L ≥ (1− q) [SLL − βP (αH , xLL)L] , (2.11)
SLL − βP (αL, xLL)L ≥ (1− q) [SLH − βP (αL, xLH)L] . (2.12)
Let x̂HH , ŜHH , x̂HL, ŜHL be the solutions to the optimization problem when
η = αH , and x̂LH , ŜLH ,x̂LL, ŜLL be the solutions to the optimization problem
when η = αL, the next section will discuss the features of these solutions.
2.4 Benefits of Security Audits
The following lemma give the characteristics of the constraints.4
4Detailed proofs of lemmas and propositions are provided in the appendix.
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Lemma 1 Constraints (2.8) and (2.12) bind; constraints (2.6) and (2.10)
are redundant.
Constraints (2.6) and (2.10) guarantee the agent get his reservation utility
when he observes α = αL, while constraints (2.8) and (2.12) induce the agent to
report the state αL truthfully. Since the principal is inclined to invest less under
the state αL, when the agent observed α = αL, he has the incentive to send a
false report so that he can get more investments. In order to make the agent
tell the truth, the principal has to provide additional incentives to compensate
the agent. As a result, the truth-telling constraint binds, and the agent will get
a utility greater than the reservation utility when he observe α = αL.
Lemma 2 Constraints (2.5) and (2.9) bind; constraints (2.7) and (2.11) are
redundant.
When the agent observes α = αH , he does not have incentives to lie unless
the principal over-compensates the agent for telling α = αL. However, since
the principal will minimize her own expected costs, over-compensating would
contradict her objective. Hence, when α = αH is observed by the agent, the
truth telling constraint is redundant and reservation utility constraint binds.
Proposition 1 Compared with the full information solutions, the imperfect in-
formation solutions have the following features, regardless of the principal’s sig-
nal: when the agent reports α = αH, the principal invests more than she does
in the full information case and the agent receives less salary; when the agent
reports α = αL, the principal invests the exactly same amount as she does in the
full information case and the agent receives more salary, i.e.,
x̂HH > x
∗
















L, and ŜLL > S
∗
L. (2.16)
Intuitively, since the agent cannot benefit from reporting α = αL if he actu-
ally observes α = αH . Thus, the principal tends to trust a report that α = αL
and sticks to the optimal investment level. However, when the agent reports
α = αH , the principal will deviate from the investment decisions under full in-
formation case by increasing the investment level. Such deviations result in the
following consequences: the expected cost from breaches is reduced, and the
agent’s expected disutility from security breaches is reduced. Consequently, the
principal does not need to compensate the agent for his disutility as much, the
agent’s salary in the αH state is less than that under full information environ-
ment. On the contrary, the agent’s salary in the αL state is more than that
under the full information environment, because the principal needs to provide
the agent additional motivation to report the state truthfully.
As mentioned above, the principal believes that the agent is telling the truth
when he reports α = αL. One interesting question is that, would it be necessary
for the principal to pre-commit to a security audit when the agent reports α =
αL? If it is not, with a costly security audit, the principal will always be better off
by pre-committing to security audits only when the agent reports α = αH . Under
these circumstances, the principal would design the contracts in the following
ways. She would minimize the same total cost as before, but subject to different





ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + SHH ]
+
(1− ξ)PL




SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L ≥ 0, (2.17)
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L ≥ 0, (2.18)
SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L ≥ [SHL − βP (αH , xHL)L] , (2.19)
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L ≥ (1− q) [SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L] . (2.20)





(1− ξ)PH + ξPL [P (αH , xLH)L+ xLH + SLH ]
+
ξPL
(1− ξ)PH + ξPL [P (αL, xLL)L+ xLL + SLL]
)
subject to
SLH − βP (αH , xLH)L ≥ 0, (2.21)
SLL − βP (αL, xLL)L ≥ 0, (2.22)
SLH − βP (αH , xLH)L ≥ [SLL − βP (αH , xLL)L] , (2.23)
SLL − βP (αL, xLL)L ≥ (1− q) [SLH − βP (αL, xLH)L] . (2.24)
Following the proof for the lemmas, one may find that the changed constraints are
not binding, which means that the principal will offer the exact same contracts
to the agent regardless of whether she would pre-commit to a security audit
when the agent reports α = αL. However, from the principal’s point of view, not
pre-committing is always more cost efficient than pre-committing to a security
audit.
Proposition 2 Given that a security audit is costly, it would be in the best
interest of the principal to pre-commit to a security audit only when the agent
reports that α = αH.
30
Another interesting result from proposition 1 is that the principal tends to
overinvest in the high productivity case. This is not consistent with the conclu-
sions from Harris and Raviv (1996). In their model, Harris and Raviv find that
the principal tends to underinvest in high productivity project while overinvest
in low productivity project. This is because that Harris and Raviv assume that
the agent’s salary is fixed regardless of the agent’s message. By having a fixed
salary, the principal can only affect the agent’s payoffs by adjusting the invest-
ment level. In order to make sure the agent does not have the incentive to lie
in his report, the principal would increase his payoff in low productivity case by
overinvesting and decrease his payoff in high productivity case by underinvesting.
On the contrary, the current model assumes that the agent’s salary is based
on the report he submitted to the principal. In the high productivity case, the
principal does not need to provide truth-telling motivation, hence the salary
would be decreasing as the investment level increases. By overinvesting in high
productivity case, the principal offers more investment but less salary to the
agent. Thus, when the agent actually observes α = αL but reports α = αH ,
he would benefit from receiving more investments but lose some of the salary.
Since the salary is decreasing at the same rate as the investment would benefit
the agent in the high productivity case, it is decreasing at a higher rate than
the benefit in the low productivity case. Therefore, by overinvesting in the high
productivity case, the principal actually reduces the payoff of the agent gets from
lying when the true state is α = αL.
Proposition 3 If the difference in marginal cost savings of the investment be-
tween state αH and αL is a decreasing function of x, i.e., Px(αH , x)−Px(αL, x) is
an increasing function of x, then the principal will invest less in the high produc-
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tivity state when she observes η = αH than she will when she observes η = αL;
however, she will invest the same amount in low productivity state regardless the
signal η she observes. The agent will receives more salary when the principal
observes η = αH and less salary when the principal observes η = αL, regardless





Recall from proposition 1, only when α = αH , the principal will deviate from
the optimal investment decision rules by overinvesting in information security.
As the principal’s inferred probability of αH being the true state increases, such
deviation will become more costly. If the principal observes η = αH , she infers
that it is more likely that αH is the true state than she does under the case
η = αL is observed. Hence, the principal would overinvest to a lesser extent
when she observes η = αH than she would when she observes η = αL. As a
result, she has to compensate the agent more for not investing as much when
she observes η = αH .
Define information rent (IR) as the part of the agent’s expected utility ex-
ceeding his reservation utility. Information rent measures how much the prin-
cipal has to compensate the agent so that the agent will report truthfully. It
can also be interpreted as the agent’s payoff from possessing better information.
Formally, when the true state is α = αH , the expected information rent IRH is
IRH = Pr (η = αH |α = αH)
h
ŜHH − βP (αH , x̂HH)L
i
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+Pr (η = αL|α = αH)
h
ŜLH − βP (αH , x̂LH)L
i
;
when the true state is α = αL, the expected information rent IRL is
IRL = Pr (η = αH |α = αL)
h
ŜHL − βP (αL, x̂HL)L
i
+Pr (η = αL|α = αL)
h
ŜLL − βP (αL, x̂LL)L
i
.
Proposition 4 The agent receives no information rent when the true state is
α = αH, the agent receives positive information rent when the true state is
α = αL, i.e.,
IRH = 0,
IRH > 0.
The following propositions characterize the effects of information asymmetry
and security audit intensity on principal’s ex ante cost.





As ξ increases, signal η provides more relevant information on α, and the
information asymmetry between principal and agent decreases. The ex ante
cost is decreasing in ξ, which means when the signal η becomes more precise,
the principal expects to incur less total costs. Intuitively, the principal is more
confident in her own signal, the burden of inducing the agent report truthfully
is alleviated. Hence, the agency costs are reduced. The principal is in a better
position when less information asymmetry exists.
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Proposition 6 As the intensity of a security audit increases, the principal’s ex




This proposition suggests that there is a value to information security audits.
Security audit provides the principal a certain chance to catch the agent lying.
If the agent is found lying, he’ll be removed and get zero utility. The agent’s
payoff from lying is thus reduced by security audits. This means if the principal
commits to a certain security audit policy, the cost of motivating the agent to
tell the truth will be reduced. As the security audit becomes more intensive,
the chance of the principal catching the agent lying increases. As a result, the
principal needs to pay less to motivate truthful reporting, and the investment
decision rules are less distorted. The information security audits have value
because they reduce the principal’s ex ante costs. This does not imply that
firms should always pursue the maximal security audit intensity. The above
result has yet to consider the cost of security audits. As the audit intensity
goes up, the cost of conducting security audits may also go up. It might even
be prohibitively costly to conduct a security audit that provides the principal a
hundred percent chance of catching the agent lying.
Proposition 7 If in addition P (α, x) satisfies either
P (α, x) = P (1)(α) ∗ P (2)(x), (2.25)
P (2)xx (x) is a monotonic function,
or








i.e., as information asymmetry decreases, the marginal benefit of security audit
decreases.
Proposition 7 gives two sufficient conditions that the marginal benefit from
security audit decreases as information asymmetry decreases. These conditions
include wide classes of functions, such as exponential functions, log functions,
inverse polynomial functions, etc. The conclusion is an interesting insight pro-
vided by the model. Although reducing information asymmetry and increasing
security audit intensity both reduces the principal’s costs, the marginal benefit
of security audits decreases as the information asymmetry decreases.
2.5 Costs of Security Audits and Optimal Se-
curity Audit Intensity
The previous analyses show that security audits are beneficial to organizations
in that they mitigate the negative impacts of information asymmetry between
the principal and the agent. However, in order to determine the optimal level
of a security audit, the model has yet to take the costs of security audits into
considerations.
Naturally, when no security audit is conducted, i.e., the intensity of a security
audit equals zero, the cost of security audits would be zero. As the security audit
intensity is measured as the chance that the principal would catch the agent lying,
one can imagine that the costs for security audits increase as such chance gets
35
greater. As the chance gets close to one, the costs of security audits may become
prohibitive, as the audit may have to be able to eliminate most uncertainty the
principal has about the system and the agent. In the extreme case, it may be
even impossible to conduct a security audit that provides the principal a hundred
percent chance to catch the agent lying. Therefore, the model assumes that the
cost of security audits (K) is convex in security audit intensity. As the intensity








K (0) = 0,
lim
q→1K (q) → ∞.
As stated in proposition 7, the benefit of security audits also increases as
the audit intensity increases. A close examination of the model reveals that the
benefit is also convex in the audit intensity (detailed derivation can be found in
the Appendix). As shown in the figures (2.3) and (2.4), there are two possible
scenarios.
In Scenario 1, the cost of security audits is always greater than the benefits.
As shown in the figure, the cost curve is always above the benefit curve and
hence no security audit will happen. In Scenario 2, compared to the benefits, the
cost of security audits increases slower at first, but faster as the audit intensity
approaches to one. In some interval, the cost is less than the benefit, an optimal
audit intensity which leads to maximum net benefits from security audits can be












Figure 2.4: Scenario 2
38
model will further investigate the more interesting case, Scenario 2.
The discussion in last section assumes that the principal would pre-commit
to a certain intensity of security audits. Since the principal observes a signal of
the system’s true state α before entering the contract, the principal can make
the pre-commitment based on the signal observed. Assume the cost of security
audits does not depend on the signal the principal observed. An interesting
question to ask is when the principal will pre-commit to more security audits.
Will the principal want to audit more when a bad signal, η = αH , is observed?
Common sense may suggest that she will, since a bad signal means the principal
has more to lose, and hence she may want to impose more control over the
information system. However, the conventional wisdom is not supported by the
following proposition.
Proposition 8 The principal does not necessarily pre-commit to a more inten-
sive security audit when she observes η = αH than when she observes η = αL.
2.6 A Special Case and Numerical Example
In order to provide closed-form solutions and more intuitive insights, this section
gives a special case and numerical example of the model. Let




Figure 2.5 shows the graph of this probability function under different α. Figure
2.6 illustrates the marginal benefits (−Px (α, x)) of security investment under
different α. As mentioned before, a greater α represents a worse-secured infor-
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Figure 2.6: −Px (α, x) dots (α = 0.7) and solid (α = 0.4)
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As assumed by the model, information security investments reduce the prob-
ability of a security breach. Thus, for a given investment level, the system with
a higher α always benefits more, but yields lower information security level. The
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Hence the ex ante costs of the principal can be written as
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Figure 2.7 shows how the investment levels of x̂HH and x̂LH change as the infor-
mation asymmetry measure ξ changes when the agent reports α = αH . Recall
that the principal overinvests when the agent reports α = αH . If the principal
observes η = αH , as ξ increases, the principal is more confident that αH is the
true state, overinvesting becomes more costly, hence, the principal will cut back
the overinvestment. On the contrary, if the principal observes η = αL, as ξ
increases, the principal believes that the chance of αH being the true state is
remote, overinvesting becomes less costly. Figure 2.8 shows how the investment
levels of x̂HH and x̂LH change with the security audit intensity q when the agent
reports α = αH . Security audits provide the principal a chance to catch the
agent lying, hence reduce the agent’s incentive to report the false state. Thus
the principal’s investment decision rules become closer to those under full infor-
mation case. The changes of investment levels of x̂HL and x̂LL when the true
state is α = αL are not plotted because they are independent of ξ and q.
Figure 2.9 and 2.10 show how the agent’s salary under various circumstances
changes with the information asymmetry measure ξ changes. Since the agent
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Figure 2.7: x̂HH (ξ) (dots) and x̂LH (ξ) (solid), where q =
1
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Figure 2.8: x̂HH (q) (dots) and x̂LH (q) (solid), where ξ =
2
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Figure 2.9: ŜHH (ξ) (dots) and ŜLH (ξ) (solid), q =
1
2
, PH = PL =
1
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security means the principal will pay less salary to the agent. Thus, ŜHH and
ŜLH will always move in the opposite direction to x̂HH and x̂LH .
Figure 2.11 and 2.12 plot how security audit intensity q affects the agent’s
salary. When q increases, the principal’s investment decision rules deviate less
from those in full information case. As a result, the agent’s salaries also move
to those under full information case.
Figure 2.13 plots the relation between information asymmetry ξ and the
principal’s ex ante costs and Figure 2.14 plots the relation between security
audit intensity q and the principal’s ex ante costs. Both figures confirm that the
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Figure 2.10: ŜHL (ξ) (dots) and ŜLL (ξ) (solid), q =
1
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Figure 2.11: ŜHH (q) (dots) and ŜLH (q) (solid), ξ =
2
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Figure 2.12: ŜHL (q) (dots) and ŜLL (q) (solid), ξ =
2
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Figure 2.13: C (ξ), solid (q = 1
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Figure 2.14: C (q) solid (ξ = 2
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) and dots (ξ = 9
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), PH = PL = 0.5
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Chapter 3
Market Impacts of Security Breaches
3.1 Methodology
3.1.1 Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Model
The classical asset-pricing model suggests that a stock’s return is a positive
linear function of its market β (the slope in the regression of a stock’s return
on the market’s return). By applying CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model,
see Sharpe, 1964 and Lintner, 1965), researchers implicitly assume that β alone
captures the systematic risk of stocks. However, empirical studies suggest that
many other factors also have incremental explanatory power to market β for
expected returns. These factors include size (Banz, 1981), financial leverage
(Bhandari, 1988), book-to-market equity (Stattman, 1980, and Rosenberg, Reid
and Lanstein, 1985) and earnings-price ratios (Basu, 1983 and Ball, 1978).
Fama and French (1992) cross-sectionally examine these factors. They find
that while each of the factors alone does have explanatory power, two factors
(size and book-to-market equity) combined seem to absorb the cross-sectional
variation in average stock returns associated with all other factors. Fama and
48
French (1993) conduct time-series tests and identify three common risk factors
in the returns on stocks. These three risk factors are excess market returns,
size and book-to-market equity. Fama and French argue that the risks of stocks
are multidimensional, a one-factor model like CAPM can capture only one di-
mension of the risks. Although the underlying risks associated with size and
book-to-equity have yet to be identified, combining these two factors into re-
turn regressions seems to help incorporating other dimensions of the risks and
yields better results. Formally stated, Fama and French propose the following
three-factor regression model to explain securities’ returns:
R (t)−RF (t) = a+ b [RM (t)−RF (t)] + sSMB (t) + hHML (t) + e (t)
where
R (t) = the return to be explained over time period t;
RF (t) = the risk-free rate over time period t;
RM (t) = value-weighted return on market portfolio over time period t;
SMB (t) = (small minus big) the difference between the return on a portfolio
of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks
over time peirod t;
HML (t) = (high minus low) the differenct btween the return on a portfolio
of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of
low-book-to-market stocks over time period t.
Fama and French (1996) continue the line of this research by showing that
most asset pricing anomalies can be explained by the three-factor model proposed
in Fama and French (1993).
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In the following part of this study, the three-factor regression model of Fama
and French (1993) will be used to capture the market’s expectation of stocks’
returns, as it can more precisely reflect the multidimensional risks and provide
more rigorous conclusions.
3.1.2 Hypothesis Development
This study first examines the overall economic effects of publicly announced
security breach events. Campbell et al. (2003) state that there is no significant
market reaction to public reports of information security breaches. The following
null hypothesis H10 tests if such conclusion applies to the extended sample.
H10: There is no stock market reaction to public reports of corpo-
rate information security breaches.
Campbell et al. (2003) show that security incidents involving breaches of
confidential information on average have significant negative market reactions,
while non-confidential security incidents do not have significant market reactions.
With a bigger sample and a more sophisticated model, these statements can be
examined with more confidence. The full sample is divided into two sub-samples:
i.e., information security breach events involving breaches of confidential infor-
mation and those not involving breaches of confidential events. HypothesesH2A
and H2B examine the market reactions of each sub-sample respectively.
H2A: There is no stock market reaction to public reports of cor-
porate information security breaches involving unauthorized access to
confidential information.
H2B: There is no stock market reaction to public reports of corpo-
rate information security breaches that do not involve unauthorized
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access to confidential information.
Some researchers (Garg et al., 2003) suggest that computer virus incidents
should be excluded from the event study sample because computer viruses are
general in nature and it is hard to specify which firms were infected and the
exact date of the outbreaks. During the event search of this study, 32 informa-
tion security breach incidents were identified as being associated with computer
viruses. Each event is announced with clear specifications of firms affected and
date of virus infections. Thus the non-confidential event sub-sample is further
partitioned into two categories: computer virus related events and non-computer
virus related events. Hypotheses H3A and H3B address the market reactions to
each group of events.
H3A: There is no stock market reaction to public reports of non-
confidential corporate information security breaches involving com-
puter viruses.
H3B: There is no stock market reaction to public reports of non-
confidential corporate information security breaches that do not in-
volve computer viruses.
3.1.3 Sample Selection
The publicly announced information security breach events were identified by
electronically searching the full text of ten major newspapers over the time pe-
riod from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2002. Besides the five news pa-
per included in Campbell et al. (2003) (Wall Street Journal, New York Times,
Washington Post, Financial Times and USA Today), additional five newspapers
(Boston Globe, Chicago Sun-Times, Houston Chronicle, Los Angeles Times and
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San Francisco Chronicle) were added in the extended search. All the newspa-
pers are among the top 20 largest circulations, the newly added five newspapers
also present a regional distribution across the United States. The keywords in
the search include: “information security breach”, “computer system security”,
“hacker”, “cyber attack”, “computer attack”, “computer break-in” and “com-
puter virus”.
The search returned 159 information security breach events associated with
US corporations. In order to study the stock price reactions to these events,
the following criteria are imposed. To be included in the final sample, each
affected firm must have a sufficiently long history of return data available on the
Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, and the events must be
announced within a month after the breaches actually happened. Additionally,
there should be no mergers or acquisitions occurring during either the estimation
periods or test windows. For firms with multiple breach events, only those events
for which the estimation periods do not overlap previous breaches are included.
For information breaches that happened after September 11, 2001, the estimation
periods must not overlap with the 9/11 attack. Only 71 events qualify all the





Initial number of security breaches 159 159
CRSP data availability (51) 108
Events occurred within a month of announcement (6) 102
Estimation period covers 9/11 (9) 93
Overlapping multiple security breaches (14) 79
Short history or mergers (8) 71
Table 2 lists all the events in the final sample. Based on the nature of the
breached information, each event in the final sample is identified as “Confiden-
tial” breach or “Non-confidential” breach. The 9 “Confidential” events involve
unauthorized access to confidential information, e.g. unauthorized access to
credit card data, unauthorized access to customer’s personal data, etc. The
remaining 62 events do not involve unauthorized access to confidential informa-
tion. Among the 62 non-confidential events, over half (32) events are security
breaches involving computer viruses and the rest (30) are information security
incidents that did not involve computer viruses.
Table 3 presents the industry distribution of the firms. Several firms had
multiple security breaches, therefore, though there are 71 information security
breach events, there are only 62 firms in the sample. The 62 firms come from
15 different industries, including both high-tech industries and traditional man-
ufacturing or service industries. Industrial clustering poses a potential issue in
the sample since there are 20 firms from the business service industry.
All the return data are collected from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database.
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Following from Fama and French (1993,1996), the explanatory returns RM ,
SMB, and HML are formed as follows. At the end of each year (1994-2001),
NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks are all divided into two groups (small or
big, S or B) based on whether their year-end market equity (ME, stock price
times shares outstanding) is below or above the median ME for NYSE stocks.
NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks are allocated into three book-to-market equity
(BE/ME) groups (low, medium, or high; L, M, or H) based on the breakpoints
for the bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent and top 30 percent of the values
of BE/ME for NYSE stocks. Six size-BE/ME portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L,
B/M and B/H) are defined as the intersections of the two ME and the three
BE/ME groups. Value-weighted daily returns on each portfolio are calculated
for the following year. SMB is the difference between the average of the returns
on the three small-stock portfolios (S/L, S/M and S/H) and the average of
the return on the three big-stock portfolios (B/L, B/M and B/H). HML is the
difference between the average of the returns on the two high-BE/ME portfolios
(S/H and B/H) and the average of the returns on the two low-BE/ME portfo-
lios (S/L and B/L). RM is the value-weighted return on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq
stocks1.
1BE is the book value of stockholder’s equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and in-
vestment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. Firms with negative BEs were
excluded when the size-BE/ME portfolios were formed.
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Table 2 Sample information security breach events
Company name Source Date Confidentiality Event description
Ford Motor New York Times 05/17/02 Confidential Unauthorized use of
Credit Company authorization code
Vivendi Universal Financial Times 04/27/02 Non-confidential Unauthorized access to
electronic voting system
Interland Inc Washington Post 03/21/02 Non-confidential Unauthorized website
entry & alteration
Verisign Inc Washington Post 03/21/02 Non-confidential Unauthorized website
entry & alteration
Citigroup Financial Times 09/06/01 Non-confidential Unauthorized service
interruption
Qwest Communications USA Today 08/20/01 Non-confidential “Code Red” worm
AT & T Corp. USA Today 08/20/01 Non-confidential “Code Red” worm
FedEx Corp Wall Street Journal 08/09/01 Non-confidential “Code Red” worm
Ask Jeeves Inc. USA Today 08/09/01 Non-confidential “Code Red” worm
(Excite.com)
Cox Communications USA Today 08/09/01 Non-confidential “Code Red” worm
A O L Time Warner Inc USA Today 08/09/01 Non-confidential “Code Red” worm
Dow Jones & Co. Wall Street Journal 07/20/01 Non-confidential “Code Red” worm
DoubleClick Inc. Wall Street Journal 03/30/01 Non-confidential Unauthorized website entry
Egghead.com Inc Washington Post 12/23/00 Confidential Unauthorized access to
credit card data
Disney USA Today 09/27/00 Confidential Unauthorized access to
Disney World guest data
First Data Corp. Wall Street Journal 09/11/00 Confidential Unauthorized acess to
(Western Union) credit & debit card data
Nike Inc Wall Street Journal 06/22/00 Non-confidential Unauthorized traffic
re-direction
TicketMaster Online USA Today 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
Citysearch
Cognos Inc USA Today 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
Bear Stearns Cos USA Today 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
Trans World Airlines Inc. USA Today 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
Estee Lauder Cos Wall Street Journal 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
Ford Motor Corp Wall Street Journal 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
Barnes & Noble Wall Street Journal 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
Vodafone Group PLC Financial Times 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
(Vodafone AirTouch)
AT & T Corp. Chicago Sun-Times 05/05/00 Non-confidential love bug
National Discount Brokers Wall Street Journal 02/25/00 Non-confidential Unauthorized service
interruption
McGraw-Hill Cos Wall Street Journal 02/22/00 Confidential Unauthorized access to
confidential info by employee
Aastrom Biosciences Inc. Wall Street Journal 02/18/00 Non-confidential Unauthorized website
entry & alteration
PairGain Technologies Inc. Wall Street Journal 02/18/00 Non-confidential Unauthorized website
entry & alteration
MCI WorldCom Inc Wall Street Journal 02/10/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
CNET Networks Inc Wall Street Journal 02/10/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
(ZDNet)
About.com Wall Street Journal 02/10/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
Time warner Inc (CNN) Washington Post 02/09/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
Amazon.com Inc. Wall Street Journal 02/09/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
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Company name Source Date Confidentiality Event description
Charles Schwab Corp Wall Street Journal 02/08/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
Yahoo! Wall Street Journal 02/08/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
Lycos Financial Times 02/08/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
E-Trade Group USA Today 02/08/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
eBay Inc. USA Today 02/08/00 Non-confidential Denial of service
Drug Emporium Inc. Wall Street Journal 01/31/00 Confidential Unauthorized access to
credit card data
America Online Wall Street Journal 01/27/00 Non-confidential Flaw in email system
Northwest Airlines Corp Wall Street Journal 01/10/00 Confidential Unauthorized access to
credit card data
Banc of America San Francisco Chronicle 12/02/99 Non-confidential Minizip virus
Dell Computer Corp Financial Times 11/19/99 Non-confidential Production interruption
by virus
Critical Path Inc. Wall Street Journal 09/22/99 Non-confidential Flaw in email system
Symantec Corp Houston Chronicle 08/06/99 Non-confidential Unauthorized website
entry & alteration
Network Solutions Inc Washington Post 07/03/99 Non-confidential Unauthorized webstie
entry & traffic redirection
Electronic Arts Inc. Wall Street Journal 06/14/99 Non-confidential Worm.Explore.Zip virus
(Maxis Studios)
Motorola Chicago Sun-Times 06/13/99 Non-confidential Worm.Explore.Zip virus
AT& T Corp. Financial Times 06/12/99 Non-confidential Worm.Explore.Zip virus
Lehman Brothers Financial Times 06/12/99 Non-confidential Worm.Explore.Zip virus
Holdings Inc.
Boeing co. Financial Times 06/12/99 Non-confidential Worm.Explore.Zip virus
General Electric Boston Globe 06/11/99 Non-confidential Worm.Explore.Zip virus
Playboy Enterprises Chicago Sun-Times 03/30/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
International
Chevron Corp San Francisco Chronicle 03/30/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
Northrop Grumman Corp. Wall Street Journal 03/30/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc USA Today 03/30/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
Compaq Computer Corp USA Today 03/30/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
Lockheed Martin Corp USA Today 03/30/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
Intel Corp. New York Times 03/29/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
Charles Schweb New York Times 03/29/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
& Company
Lucent Technologies New York Times 03/29/99 Non-confidential Melissa Virus
Microsoft Corp. Wall Street Journal 10/27/98 Confidential Unauthorized access to
subscriber data
America Online Wall Street Journal 10/19/98 Non-confidential Unauthorized alteration of
services address
New York Times Co. Wall Street Journal 09/14/98 Non-confidential Unauthorized webstie
entry & alteration
America Online Wall Street Journal 01/05/98 Confidential Unauthorized access to
passwords/credit card data
Yahoo! Chicago Sun-Times 12/10/97 Non-confidential Unauthorized website
entry & alteration
Microsoft Corp. Wall Street Journal 06/23/97 Non-confidential Unauthorized service
intterruption
America Online San Francisco Chronicle 02/07/97 Non-confidential Unauthorized service
interruption
New York Times Boston Globe 08/04/95 Non-confidential Unauthorized service
interruption
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Table 3 Sample industry distribution
SIC Industry description No. of firms
1700 Construction special trade contractors 1
2700 Printing, publising & allied industries 4
2800 Chemicals & allied products 2
2900 Petroleum refining & related industries 1
3000 Rubber & miscellaneous plastics products 1
3500 Industrial & commercial machinery & 2
computer equipment
3600 Electronic & other electrical equipment & 4
components, except computer equipment
3700 Transportation equipment 5
4500 Transportation by air 3
4800 Communications 6
5900 Miscellaneous retail 2
6000 Depository institutions 1
6100 Non-depository credit institutions 1
6200 Security & commodity brokers, dealers, 6
exchanges & services
7300 Business Service 20




Like Campbell et al. (2003), this study uses both the ordinary least square (OLS)
regression and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to estimate the parameters.
Standard event study approaches mainly use OLS methodology. OLS requires
the error terms from regressions are independently identically distributed. How-
ever, there are some industry clustering as well as some event clustering (e.g.,
the denial-of-service attack events in February 2000 and some computer virus
events) in the sample. To address the possible heteroskedasticity and intercor-
related error term issues in the sample, this study also adopts SUR method in
regressions.
OLS Methodology
Following directly from Fama and French (1993), the expected return of each
individual firm is fitted by
Rit = ai + biRMt + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit,
where:
Rit = return for firm i’s stock on day t, net of the risk-free rate;
Rmt = return for the market on day t, net of the risk-free rate;
SMBt = the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks
and the return of on a portfolio of large stocks on day t;
HMLt = the differenct btween the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-
market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-
market stocks on day t;
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ai, bi, si, hi = intercept and slope parameters for firm i;
εit = disturbance term.
The parameters âi, b̂i, ŝi, ĥi are estimated using an estimation period of 120 days.
For each security breach incident, the estimation period starts 121 trading days
before the event announcement and ends 2 trading days before the announce-
ment. The abnormal returns for each event day are then computed as follows:
ARit = Rit −
³
âi + b̂iRMt + ŝiSMBt + ĥiHMLt
´
.
The abnormal returns (AR) reflects differences between the realized returns on
event days and the market expected returns for each individual firm, thus can
be thought as a measurement of impact of security breaches on the market. A
three-day event window, which includes the announcement day, previous trading
day and subsequent trading day, is used to capture the whole impact of an
information security breach. The cumulated abnormal return for firm i (CARi)






[t1, t2] = the event interval.







where N = the number of events.
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SUR Methodology
The SUR method is one type of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) models and
as mentioned above, is used in this study to address the heteroskedasticity and
clustering issues in the sample. To be more specific, for the 71 events in the
sample, the SUR model goes as follows:
R1t = a1 + b1RMt + s1SMBt + h1HMLt + γ1D + ε1t,
R2t = a2 + b2RMt + s2SMBt + h2HMLt + γ2D + ε2t,
...
RNt = aN + bNRMt + sNSMBt + hNHMLt + γND + εNt,
where D = 1 if within the 3 day event period [−1,+1], and 0 otherwise.
The coefficient γi is used to capture the abnormal returns on the event days
and follow the example of OLS method, the average effects of the events can







if there is no significant market reaction to the information security breach
events, it is expected that γ = 0.
3.2 Results
Table 4 shows the results from OLS method. Although in all cases mean CARs
have negative sign, for the full sample, the null hypothesis that there were no
market reactions to the reports of security breaches cannot be rejected. The
Z-statistic is only marginally significant in this case. When the full sample is
split into two categories, confidential events and non-confidential events, the
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results show that for confidential event sub-sample the market has a significant
reaction (mean CAR = −0.0502) to the reports of information security breaches,
while for the non-confidential events, the market has no significant reaction to
the reports of security breaches. These results verify those of Campbell et al.
(2003).
In order to exclude the possibility that the insignificance of non-confidential
events is caused by inclusions of computer virus related events in the sample, the
non-confidential events are further partitioned into two groups, virus related and
non-virus related information security incidents. The tests show no significant
market reactions for either group. Thus one can conclude that the insignificance
of non-confidential events is not driven by the inclusion of computer virus re-
lated events. Further dividing the non-confidential events based on whether they
were computer virus related does not seem to provide additional insights on the
economic impacts of information security breaches.
Table 4: Results from OLS method
N Mean CAR Z-stat % negative CARs
Panel A (full sample)
Full sample 71 −0.0140 −1.5443 60.56
Panel B (sample partitions based on confidentiality)
Confidential events 9 −0.0502 −2.3009 66.67
Non-confidential events 62 −0.0088 −0.8867 54.84
Panel C (sample partitions based on virus)
Virus events 32 −0.0056 −0.5397 59.38
Non-virus events 30 −0.0122 −0.7070 50.00
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The results from SUR method (as shown in table 5) further confirm the
findings from OLS regressions. After controlling the possible heteroskedasticity
and intercorrelation problems, SUR derives similar results to those of OLS. The
F -value (2.30) for the whole sample is still not significant (Pr > F = 0.1292),
thus one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no market reaction to the
reported security breaches. For the confidential events, however, the F -value
(5.17) is significant (Pr > F = 0.0230) to reject the hypothesis that there is
no market reaction to the reports of security breaches. In contrast, for non-
confidential events, the F -value is again insignificant (Pr > F = 0.3755). Further
partitioning the sample into virus-related events and non virus-related events
shows that neither group caused significant market reactions.
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Table 5: Results from SUR method
Avg. Hypothesis (avg. coeff=0)
Panel A (full sample)
F -value 2.30
Pr > F 0.1292
D.F. 1
8378
Panel B (confidential event sub-sample)
F -Value 5.17
Pr > F 0.0230
D.F. 1
8378
Panel C (non-confidentail event sub-sample)
F -Value 0.79




Table 5 Results from SUR method (cont’d)
Avg. Hypothesis (avg. coeff=0)
Panel D (virus related non-confidential event sub-sample)
F -value 0.41
Pr > F 0.5236
D.F. 1
8378
Panel E (other non-confidential event sub-sample)
F -value 0.44






4.1 Information Security Audits and Asymmet-
ric Information
Using a principal-agent model, the first part of this dissertation examines the
interactions between information asymmetry and security audits during the se-
curity investment process. Although the model is developed for a security in-
vestment environment, the setup and conclusions can be easily applied to other
scenarios of capital investments and audits (i.e., information security audits can
be thought of as sub-class of various types of audits).
Consistent with a common practice of security audits, the model suggests
that a security audit does have value to a firm due to information asymmetry
between different levels of management. Under asymmetric information, the
principal (e.g., firm’s CEO principal) will deviate from the optimal investment
rules in order to motivate truthful reports from the agent (e.g., the CISO).
More specifically, the principal tends to over-invest, when compared with the
symmetric information case, in security projects with high productivity, but
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sticks to the optimal investment rules when the productivity is low. The CISO
(i.e., the agent), who possesses more precise information than the CEO (i.e., the
principal) and always prefers more investments than the CEO, has an incentive
to lie in his report when the productivity is low. As a result, the agent will receive
information rent when the true productivity is low as a reward for reporting the
truth. Information security audits act to both mitigate such deviations and
reduce the CISO’s payoff from false reports.
There are limitations of the model presented in this dissertation, which rep-
resent directions for future research. The most obvious of these limitations are
the need to model the costs of information security audits and the agent’s ef-
fort level. These limitations notwithstanding, the current model provides use-
ful insights into the relations among information security auditing, information
asymmetry and firm value.
4.2 Impacts of Information Security Breaches
The second part of this dissertation extends the earlier work of Campbell et al.
(2003) by examining the market reactions to publicly announced information
security breaches from 1995 to 2002. A more sophisticated model is used to
capture the market’s expectation of stock returns. Our results are consistent
with those of Campbell et al. (2003). Overall, the market only has marginal
negative reaction to reports of information security breach events. Partitioning
the events based on the confidentiality of the information breached revealed a
clearer picture. For those reports of events involving unauthorized access to
confidential information, the market shows a statistically significant negative
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price reaction. On the contrary, no significant market reaction was induced by
reports of non-confidential information security incidents. In summary, there are
three major contributions of this extension study:
First, a more rigorous approach is used to estimate the abnormal returns of
the events. Unlike the single factor model used in Campbell et al. (2003), a
three-factor model (Fama and French, 2003) is used to capture the behavior of
stock returns. It gives a more precise estimate of the abnormal return, which is
the key statistic used in this research. The results from this approach confirmed
the conclusions of Campbell et al. (2003).
Second, to investigate if the insignificance of non-confidential events is the
result of inclusion of computer virus-related events in the sample, this study
further examines the market reactions to non-virus non-confidential events and
virus-related non-confidential events. The tests show that the market has no
significant price reactions to the announcements of either type of events. This
finding proves that the market reaction to non-confidential security breaches is
not likely to be affected by whether the security breaches are caused by computer
viruses.
Finally, this study extends the sample of Campbell et al. (2003). Five more
major newspaper and additional two years (2001-2002) were included in the
search process. The results suggest the conclusions of Campbell et al. (2003)




• α : the state of information system, may take two values, αH or αL.
• PH : the chance that α equals αH .
• PL : the chance that α equals αL.
• α̂ : the agent’s report on α.
• η : the principal’s signal on α.
• ξ : the chance that η equals α.
• x : the level of information security investments. x∗H is the optimal level of
security investments when α = αH and there’s no information asymmetry;
x∗L is the optimal level of security investments when α = αL and there’s
no information asymmetry. When there does exist information asymmetry,
x̂HH is the optimal level of security investments when the principal observes
η = αH and the agent reports α̂ = αH ; x̂HL is the optimal level of security
investments when η = αH and α̂ = αL; x̂LH is the optimal level of security
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investments when η = αL and α̂ = αH ; and x̂LL is the optimal level of
security investments when η = αL and α̂ = αL.
• P (α, x) : the probability of an information security breach.
• L : the principal’s loss from a realized information security breach.
• β : the extent to which the agent suffers from a security breach, βL repre-
sents the agent’s disutility from a security breach.
• S : the agent’s salary. ŜHH is the optimal salary (from the principal’s
point of view) when the principal observes η = αH and the agent reports
α̂ = αH ; ŜHL is the optimal salary when η = αH and α̂ = αL; ŜLH is the
optimal salary when η = αL and α̂ = αH ; and ŜLL is the optimal salary
when η = αL and α̂ = αL.
• q : the intensity of a security audit.
• IR : information rent. IRH is the expected information rent when the true
state is α = αH , and IRL is the expected information rent when the true
state is α = αL.




6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First consider the case when the principal observes η = αH .
From constraint (2.5)
SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L ≥ 0.
Since αH > αL, it follows that
P (αH , xHH) > P (αL, xHH) > 0
and
SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L > SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L,
hence
SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L > 0,
which means
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L ≥ (1− q) [SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L] > 0.
Therefore, constraint (2.6) is redundant and constraint (2.8) binds.
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Similarly, one can show that constraint (2.10) is redundant and constraint
(2.12) binds.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Again, first consider the case when the principal observes η = αH .
Remember αH > αL, it also follows that
P (αH , xHL) > P (αL, xHL) > 0,
and
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L > SHL − βP (αH , xHL)L.
If constraint (2.5) binds, it implies
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L = 0,
but
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L > SHL − βP (αH , xHL)L.
Thus constraint (2.7) becomes redundant. Therefore, only one of constraints
(2.5) and (2.7) binds. The following proof will show that the minimized objective
function based on constraint (2.5) is always less than the minimized objective
function based on constraint (2.7), therefore constraint (2.7) is redundant.
Notice that if constraint (2.5) binds,
SHL − βP (αH , xHL)L ≤ 0;
if constraint (2.7) binds,
SHL − βP (αH , xHL)L > 0.
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From constraint (2.5), one can see
SHH ≥ βP (αH , xHH)L.
Assume constraint (2.7) binds, it implies
SHL ≥ βP (αH , xHL)L.
Hence, the objective function
ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + SHH ]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + SHL]
≥ ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + βP (αH , xHH)L]
+
(1− ξ)PL




ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + βP (αH , xHH)L]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + βP (αH , xHL)L] .
One can always find x̃HH and x̃HL that minimize g. x̃HH and x̃HL must satisfy
the following first order conditions:
(1+ β)Px (αH , xHH)L+ 1 = 0,
Px (αL, xHL)L+ βPx (αH , xHL)L+ 1 = 0.
Given
Px (αL, x̃HL) > Px (αH , x̃HL) ,
it follows directly that
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̃HH) = Px (αL, x̃HL) + βPx (αH , x̃HL)
> (1+ β)Px (αH , x̃HL) . (6.1)
72
Combined with
Pxx (α, x) > 0,
inequality (6.1) implies that
x̃HH > x̃HL.
Now assume constraint (2.5) binds, it follows
SHH = βP (αH , xHH)L,
and from constraint (2.8),
SHL = βP (αL, xHL)L+ (1− q) [SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L] .
The objective function can be written as
ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + SHH ]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + SHL]
=
ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + βP (αH , xHH)L]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL{P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + βP (αL, xHL)L
+(1− q) [SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L]},
which is always equal to or less than
f =
ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + βP (αH , xHH)L]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + βP (αL, xHL)L
+SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L].
Now compare g and f valued at x̃HH and x̃HL:




ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , x̃HH)L+ x̃HH + βP (αH , x̃HH)L]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, x̃HL)L+ x̃HL + βP (αH , x̃HL)L]
− ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , x̃HH)L+ x̃HH + βP (αH , x̃HH)L]
− (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, x̃HL)L+ x̃HL + βP (αL, x̃HL)L
+βP (αH , x̃HH)L− βP (αL, x̃HH)L]
=
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [βP (αH , x̃HL)L− βP (αL, x̃HL)L
−βP (αH , x̃HH)L+ βP (αL, x̃HH)L].
Since
x̃HH > x̃HL,









Px (αH , x) < Px (αL, x) ,
it follows that
P (αH , x̂HH)− P (αH , x̃HL) < P (αL, x̃HH)− P (αL, x̃HL) ,
i.e.,
P (αH , x̃HL)− P (αL, x̃HL) > P (αH , x̃HH)− P (αL, x̃HH) ,
hence
(g − f) |x̃HH ,x̃HL
>
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [βP (αH , x̃HH)L− βP (αL, x̃HH)L
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−βP (αH , x̃HH)L+ βP (αL, x̃HH)L]
= 0.
Note that the minimized objective function using constraints (2.7) and (2.8)
is always greater than or equal to g valued at (x̃HH , x̃HL), and the minimized
objective function using constraints (2.5) and (2.8) is always less than or equal
to f valued at (x̃HH , x̃HL). Therefore, the minimized objective function based
on constraints (2.7) and (2.8) is greater than the minimized objective function
based on constraints (2.5) and (2.8). Hence, constraint (2.7) is redundant and
constraint (2.5) binds.
Similar proofs can be applied when the principal observes η = αL, and con-
clude that constraint (2.9) is redundant and constraint (2.9) binds.
6.3 Proofs of Propositions
Eliminating the redundant constraints, the principal needs to solve the following




ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + SHH ]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + SHL]}
subject to
SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L ≥ 0.
SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L ≥ (1− q) [SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L] .
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The following procedures use Lagrangian method. The Lagrangian function $
can be written as
$ = − ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αH , xHH)L+ xHH + SHH ]
− (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [P (αL, xHL)L+ xHL + SHL]
+λH1 [SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L] + λH2{SHL
−βP (αL, xHL)L− (1− q) [SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L]}. (6.2)




ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [Px (αH , xHH)L+ 1]




= − (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [Px (αL, xHL)L+ 1]





ξPH + (1− ξ)PL + λH1 − λH2 (1− q) = 0,
∂$
∂SHL
= − (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL + λH2 = 0,
∂$
∂λH1
= SHH − βP (αH , xHH)L = 0,
∂$
∂λH2
= SHL − βP (αL, xHL)L− (1− q) [SHH − βP (αL, xHH)L] = 0.
The solutions to the above equations are:
λ̂H1 =
ξPH
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL + (1− q)
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL > 0,
λ̂H2 =
(1− ξ)PL








ξPH + (1− ξ)PL + (1− q)
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL
#
[−βPx (αH , x̂HH)L]
+
(1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL (1− q)βPx (αL, x̂HH)L = 0,
[Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1] +
"
1+ (1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
#
βPx (αH , x̂HH)L
− (1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βPx (αL, x̂HH)L = 0,
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)] = 0; (6.3)
for x̂HL :
− (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL [Px(αL, x̂HL)L+ 1]
+
− (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PLβPx (αL, x̂HL)L = 0,
Px (αL, xHL)L+ 1+ βPx (αL, x̂HL)L = 0,
(1+ β)Px (αL, xHL)L+ 1 = 0; (6.4)
for ŜHH and ŜHL:
ŜHH = βP (αH , x̂HH)L, (6.5)
ŜHL = βP (αL, x̂HL)L+ (1− q)
h
ŜHH − βP (αL, x̂HH)L
i
. (6.6)
Similarly, when the principal observes η = αL, the solutions satisfy the following
conditions:
for x̂LH :
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂LH)L+ 1
+(1− q) ξPL
(1− ξ)PH βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] = 0; (6.7)
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for x̂LL :
(1+ β)Px (αL, x̂LL)L+ 1 = 0; (6.8)
for ŜLH and ŜLL:
ŜLH = βP (αH , x̂LH)L, (6.9)
ŜLL = βP (αL, x̂LL)L+ (1− q) [SLH − βP (αL, x̂LH)L] . (6.10)
6.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (6.3) and equation (2.1) and the fact that
Px (αH , x̂HH) < Px (αL, x̂HH) ,
then
(1+ β)Px (αH , x
∗
H)L+ 1
= (1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]
< (1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1.
Combined with





From equation (2.3) and equation (6.4)
(1+ β)Px (αH , x
∗





















The proofs of x̂LH > x
∗
H , x̂LL = x
∗
L, ŜLH < S
∗
H , ŜLL > S
∗
L follows the similar
arguments without any difficulty.
6.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3








From equations (6.3) and (6.7),
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]
= (1+ β)Px (αH , x̂LH)L+ 1
+(1− q) ξPL
(1− ξ)PH βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] . (6.11)
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Assume
x̂HH > x̂LH ,
then
Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH) ≥ Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH) ,
this leads to
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]
≥ (1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] . (6.12)
Since
Px (αH , x)− Px (αL, x) < 0,
it follows that
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)]
≥ (1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) ξPL
(1− ξ)PH βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] , (6.13)
recall
Pxx (α, x) > 0,
thus
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) ξPL
(1− ξ)PH βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)]
80
> (1+ β)Px (αH , x̂LH)L+ 1
+(1− q) ξPL
(1− ξ)PH βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] . (6.14)
Combine inequalities (6.12), (6.13) and (6.14), it follows that
(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1
+(1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]
> (1+ β)Px (αH , x̂LH)L+ 1
+(1− q) ξPL
(1− ξ)PH βL [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] .
This contradicts equation (6.11), therefore, the assumption
x̂HH > x̂LH
is invalid. One can conclude that
x̂HH ≤ x̂LH .
From equations (6.5), (6.6), (6.9), (6.10), and
Px (α, x) < 0,
it can be easily shown that
ŜHH ≥ ŜLH ,
ŜHL ≥ ŜLL.
The result of x̂HL = x̂LL follows directly from proposition 1.
6.3.3 Proof of Proposition 4
From first order conditions (6.5) and (6.9),
IRH = Pr (η = αH |α = αH)
h
ŜHH − βP (αH , x̂HH)L
i
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+Pr (η = αL|α = αH)
h
ŜLH − βP (αH , x̂LH)L
i
= 0.
From first order conditions (6.6) and (6.10),
IRL = Pr (η = αH |α = αL)
h
ŜHL − βP (αL, x̂HL)L
i
+Pr (η = αL|α = αL)
h
ŜLL − βP (αL, x̂LL)L
i
= (1− ξ) (1− q)
h
ŜHH − βP (αL, x̂HH)L
i
+ξ (1− q) [SLH − βP (αL, x̂LH)L]
= (1− q) (1− ξ) βL [P (αH , x̂HH)− P (αL, x̂HH)]
+ (1− q) ξβL [P (αH , x̂LH)− P (αL, x̂LH)]
> 0.
6.3.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Principal’s ex ante cost











































x ≥ x∗H ,
function
(1+ β)P (α, x)L+ x
is increasing in x. Since
x̂HH ≤ x̂LH ,
it follows that











= [ξPH + (1− ξ)PL] ∂CH
∂q






= − (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL
³

































From equation (6.16), it follows
∂C
∂ξ
= PH [(1+ β)P (αH , x̂HH)L+ x̂HH − (1+ β)P (αH , x̂LH)L− x̂LH ]
+PL{βP (αL, x̂LL)L+ (1− q) [SLH − βP (αL, x̂LH)L]
−βP (αL, x̂HL)L− (1− q) [SHH − βP (αL, x̂HH)L]}
= PH [(1+ β)P (αH , x̂HH)L+ x̂HH − (1+ β)P (αH , x̂LH)L− x̂LH ]
+PLβL{P (αL, x̂LL) + (1− q) [P (αH , x̂LH)− P (αL, x̂LH)]
−P (αL, x̂HL)− (1− q) [P (αH , x̂HH)− P (αL, x̂HH)]}
= PH [(1+ β)P (αH , x̂HH)L+ x̂HH − (1+ β)P (αH , x̂LH)L− x̂LH ]
+PLβL (1− q) [P (αH , x̂LH)− P (αL, x̂LH)− P (αH , x̂HH) + P (αL, x̂HH)] .
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[(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1]
∂x̂HH
∂q





[Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] ∂x̂LH
∂q






{[(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂HH)L+ 1]
−PL
PH
βL (1− q) [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]}
−PH ∂x̂LH
∂q
{[(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂LH)L+ 1]
−PL
PH
βL (1− q) [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)]}









βL (1− q) [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]
−PL
PH






(1− ξ)PH βL (1− q) [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)]
−PL
PH



















(1− ξ) + 1
#
βL (1− q) [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] .












1− ξ βL (1− q) [Px (αH , x̂LH)− Px (αL, x̂LH)] .(6.17)
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Pxx (αH , x̂HH) +
(1−ξ)PL
ξPH
(1− q) [Pxx (αH , x̂HH)− Pxx (αL, x̂HH)]
.









Pxx (αH , x̂LH) +
ξPL
(1−ξ)PH (1− q) [Pxx (αH , x̂LH)− Pxx (αL, x̂LH)]
.
If P (α, x) satisfies (2.26), note that



















−Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)











































Pxx (αH , x̂LH)
1































(1+ β)Px (αH , x̂LH) + 1 ≥ (1+ β)Px(αH , x̂HH) + 1 ≥ 0
since β ¿ 1, it follows that
−PL∂x̂LH
∂q
Pxx (αH , x̂LH)
1






















[Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]


























































(1)(αH)− P (1)(αL))P (2)xx (x̂LH)
,




(1+ β)P (1)(αH)L+ (1− q) ξPL
(1− ξ)PH βL(P

































(1+ β)P (1)(αH)L+ (1− q) (1− ξ)PL
ξPH
βL(P (1) (αH)− P (1) (αL))
#−1
.
Since P (2)xx (x) is a monotone function of x, from the fact that
lim
x→∞P (α, x) = 0,



























(P (1)(αH)− P (1)(αL))P (2)xx (x̂HH)
,
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P (1)(αH)− P (1)(αL)
i
P (2)x (x̂HH),
from first order conditions (6.3) and (6.7) and the fact that Pxx (α, x) > 0, the
desired result follows.




= − (1− ξ)PL
ξPH + (1− ξ)PL
³
ŜHH − βP (αL, x̂HH)L
´
,
thus the second derivative of benefit of security audits with respect to audit







ξPH + (1− ξ)PL
³





ξPH + (1− ξ)PL
∂
³












ξPH + (1− ξ)PL
∂ [P (αH , x̂HH)− P (αL, x̂HH)]
∂q
=
(1− ξ)PLβL [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]











βL [Px (αH , x̂HH)− Px (αL, x̂HH)]

















it means the that marginal benefit of a security audit is greater when the principal
observes η = αH than when the principal observes η = αL. Thus the principal
has the incentive to pre-commit to a more intensive security audit when she
observes η = αH . However, this is not always the case, a numerical counter
example is presented below.
Let

























Thus, the principal does not always pre-commit to a more intensive security
audit when she observes η = αH .
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